Partial Subsidy for Students and Young Economists

To download the application form, please click here.

 

Conferences and Workshops

Conference in Honour of Professor Adrian Pagan
To be held at Crowne Plaza Coogee Beach, Sydney
13 - 14 July 2009

In July 2009 a two-day conference in Sydney will celebrate the work of Professor Adrian Pagan. Professor Pagan’s work has had great impact on econometrics and applied macroeconomics, and we invite papers which contribute in either of those streams for presentation at the conference. Invited keynotes will be given by Professor Hashem Pesaran and Professor Pravin Trivedi.

 

Computing in Economics and Finance (CEF09)
To be held at the University of Technology, Sydney
15 - 17 July 2009

The 15th Annual Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance (CEF 2009) will take place in Sydney, Australia from the Wednesday, 15th of July through to the Friday, 17th of July, 2009.  The program will cover all areas dealing with the computational aspects (broadly defined) of economics, finance, and decision making. The main topic areas include, Computational Econometrics and Statistics, Computational Finance, Agent-Based Computational Economics, DSGE Models, Stochastic Control in Economics and Finance, Artificial Markets, Heterogeneous Agent Economies, Dynamic Games, Open Economy Macro, Complexity in Financial Markets, Computational Macro Modelling, Nonlinear Time-Series Analysis, Dynamic Macroeconomics, Monetary Theory and Policy, Experimental Economics

Economic Design Network Winter School
To be held at the University of New South Wales, Sydney
15 - 21 July 2009

The 2009 Winter School will be devoted to the study of repeated games and reputations. The course will begin with the basics of repeated games of complete information, including the formulation of the problem, equilibrium concepts, and basic analytical techniques such as the one-shot deviation principal and self-generation. These will be used to derive the basic folk theorem results and explore applications. Attention will then turn to the theory of games of imperfect public monitoring, with particular emphasis on techniques for bounding sets of equilibrium payoffs, again culminating in a folk theorem. The course will continue to cover recent work on repeated games of private monitoring and reputations.